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THE JURY'S HISTORIC DOMAIN IN COMPLEX
CASES
Roger W. Kirst*
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution declares that
"the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."' I There have been many
disputes about the correct interpretation of that brief phrase. In the past
decade the major dispute has been the "complexity debate." Judges,
lawyers, and writers have argued about whether there should be a new
interpretation of the seventh amendment for complex litigation. The proponents of a complexity exception or interpretation contend that certain
antitrust, securities, and patent cases in federal court are too complicated
for a jury to understand; they want to eliminate or restrict any constitutional right to jury trial in "complex" cases. Their opponents defend the
use of the jury in complex cases and argue that any problems can be
solved by procedural changes short of eliminating jury trial.
The opposing sides in the complexity debate have expended tremendous effort to produce a number of lengthy judicial opinions 2 and an exProfessor of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. A portion of the research for this article
was supported by research funds provided by the University of Nebraska. I am grateful to the Dean
and Faculty of Law at the University of Auckland for the hospitality and support provided during my
leave when this article was completed. I have received substantial help from the comments of James
V. Selna and Charles Wolfram on an earlier draft of this article.
1. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution states in full:
In Suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $20, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the Common Law.
2. Opinions supporting the complexity exception include: In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on othergrounds sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1981) (mem.); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979); cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929
(1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
Opinions holding that there is no complexity exception include: In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. deniedsub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980);
Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service
Merchandise Co., 500 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacatedsub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust
Litig, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); American Can Co. v. Dart Ind., Inc., 28 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 555
1979); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 459 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal.
(N.D. Ill.
1978); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. Int'l Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. II1. 1977); Jones v.
Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Other opinions discussing the issue include: Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 444 U.S.
1093 (1980) (Rehnquist and Powell, JJ., dissenting from denial of cert.); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981); Cotten v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.
*
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tensive law review literature. 3 The first round of effort culminated in the
4
Ninth Circuit case of In re United States FinancialSecurities Litigation
and the Third Circuit case of In re JapaneseElectronicProductsAntitrust
Litigation.5 These courts agreed on the disposition of some arguments but
disagreed on the main issue in the debate. Additional articles have suggested new arguments in support of either a complexity exception or spe6
cial procedures for trying complex cases.
Despite the substantial efforts of so many, this issue of constitutional
interpretation is not yet resolved, a result that might suggest that only a
more radical reinterpretation of the seventh amendment will solve the
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1256 (1982); Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 n.20 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
1093 (1980); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); In re N-500L Cases, 517 F.Supp. 821 (D.P.R. 1981); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 441 F.Supp. 921 (S.D. Tex. 1981); McMahon v. PrenticeHall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 87 F.R.D. 560 (D.D.C. 1980); Rosen v. Dick, 83 F.R.D. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
modified, 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), modified, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); SEC
v. Assoc. Minerals, Inc., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 172 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
3. Articles arguing for the complexity exception include: Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex
Cases and Jury Trials:A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980); Devlin, Jury
Trial of Complex Cases:English Practiceat the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
43 (1980); Lynch, The Casefor Striking Jury Demands in Complex Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. OF
LITIGATION 3 (1980); Margolis & Slavitt, The Case Against Trial by Jury in Complex CivilLitigation,
7 LITIGATION, Fall 1980, at 19; Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury TrialDemand in Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243 (1980).
Articles opposing the complexity exception include: Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry into the Right to
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Blecher & Daniels, In
Defense of Juries in Complex Antitrust Litigation, I REV. OF LITIGATION 47 (1980); Blecher & Carlo,
Toward More Effective Handling of Complex Antitrust Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727; Corboy, In
Defense of the Civil Jury, 5 LITIGATION NEWS, Jan. 1980, at 2; Edquist; The Use of Juriesin Complex
Cases, 3 CORP. L. REV. 277 (1980); Hawkins, The Case for Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 7 LITGATION, Fall 1980, at 15.
Other articles discussing the issue include: Harris & Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex
Antitrust Cases?, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 611 (1979); Ungar & Mann, The Jury and the Complex
Civil Case, 6 LITIGATION, Spring 1980, at 3. See also M. SAKS, SMALL GROUP DECISION MAKING AND
COMPLEX INFORMATION TASKS (Federal Judicial Center 1981); Address by Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger to the Conference of State Chief Justices (August 7, 1979) (on file with the Washington Law

Review).
4. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
5. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
6. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES AFFECTING
COMPLEX LITIGATION (1981); Devitt, Should Jury Trial be Required in Civil Cases?, 47 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 495 (1982); Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial ofAntitrust Issues, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1981); Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 68 (1981); Loo, A Rationalefor an Exception to the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial,
30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 647 (1981). Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specifically QualifiedJuriesand Expert

Nonjury Tribunals:Alternativesfor Coping with the Complexities ofModern Civil Litigation, 67 VA.
L. REV. 887 (1981); Withrow & Suggs, Proceduresfor Improving Jury Trialsof Complex Litigation,
25 ANTITRUST BULL. 493 (1980).

The Jury and Complex Cases
complexity problem. I believe that a radical reinterpretation is not required; in fact, the complexity debate has gone on so long without being
resolved because the search for a solution has gone in the wrong direction. This article does not advocate any narrow procedural step. Instead,
it argues for a perspective different from those previously suggested.
The jury is not to blame for the complexity problem. Any blame belongs to the federal judges, who have expected juries to play an impossible role. Therefore, they must now reconsider the role of the jury in these
complex cases. The complexity debate has gone on for years, without
mention of the most valuable guidance available-the precedent that developed the judge-jury historical tests. This precedent defines the jury's
role, or "historic domain," and controls the division of power and responsibility between the judge and jury. Ignoring the judge-jury historical
test has skewed the debate, making it appear that traditional doctrine forbade any substantial change in the jury's role. The judge-jury historical
test should not be ignored any longer because it demonstrates that the
seventh amendment can be interpreted in a way that permits necessary
flexibility while preserving the constitutional protection.
It may appear that historical research has been overabundant in the
complexity debate so far. This does not confirm that history can provide
no more guidance on the complexity problem; it only confirms that the
history of the jury has been approached from the wrong perspective. The
history of the civil jury has been either minutely examined as an exercise
in strict historicism, or boldly abandoned. Strict historicism can be seen
in the attempts to prove or disprove that complexity was a head of equity
jurisdiction in 1791, and in the argument that the only role of the civil
jury is the political role of jury nullification described in the debates over
ratification of the Constitution. The bold abandonment of historical precedent can be seen in the holding that the fifth amendment due process
clause permits denial of a seventh amendment right to jury trial in complex cases.
Strict historicism ignores the problem of defining the proper role of the
jury by assuming that the matter should be controlled by a single source,
either the 1791 division of jurisdiction between law and equity or what
was said in the ratification debates. The due process approach abandons
all the historical precedent that has contributed to the proper role of the
jury and suggests no substitute for it.
The proper role of a civil jury cannot be defined in a single sentence.
There is a consensus definition useful for ordinary applications, 7 but each
new debate about the jury demonstrates the diversity of opinion about the
7. E.g., "The jury ... finds the facts and applies the law as stated by the judge to those facts,
thus reaching an ultimate conclusion or verdict." C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 16 (1962).
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jury and the consequent differences in defining its proper role. This diversity of opinion is the inevitable result of both the complexity of the jury as
an institution and the conflicting themes in the history of the jury and the
seventh amendment. Although there is clearly disagreement among the
participants in the complexity debate about the proper role of the jury,
they rarely discuss their assumptions about what that role is. Without
agreement on such a basic foundation, the debate is doomed to be one in
which the parties do not join on the real issues. Much of the complexity
debate has been of the "is competent-isn't competent" variety, with
cases and arguments displayed in the hope that the other side will not
have a rejoinder.
Resolving the complexity problem will require an interpretation of the
seventh amendment that will permit judges to handle complex cases without making the jury useless or creating such unrestrained discretion for
judges that the constitutional protection is destroyed. Protection from the
"slippery slope" of ever-increasing judicial discretion to eviscerate the
amendment must come from history, but solutions to modern problems
require using history as a guide without being needlessly bound by it.
More raw data, even more knowledge about the history of jury trial, will
be of little value without the perspective of a sound theoretical base for
understanding the history. The previously ignored judge-jury historical
test must be the starting point for interpreting the seventh amendment in
the complexity debate.
Part I of this article will review the major developments in the complexity debate. Part II will discuss the development and modem employment of the judge-jury historical test. Part III will examine how the judgejury historical test accommodates both judicial control of the jury and a
political role for the jury. Part IV will discuss how application of the
judge-jury historical test will permit judges to use new or expanded powers, such as direct judicial factfinding on some issues in complex cases.
Part V will compare the judge-jury historical test with other approaches to
the complexity problem.
I.

THE COMPLEXITY DEBATE IN REVIEW

The argument that the jury is incapable, inefficient, or error-prone has
been voiced for centuries in support of proposals to reform the jury.
change its role, or eliminate it entirely from civil litigation. 8 Although
8. Various works are listed in C. JOINER, supra note 7. at 235-38: H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL. THE
4 n.2 (1966): MODERN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 189-204 (R. Fremlin ed. 1973):

AMERICAN JURY

Green, Juries and JustIce-The Jury's Role in Personal Injurv Cases. 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 152.
167-71(1962).
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most proposed changes were never acted upon, the most recent round of
criticism of the jury spawned by the complex cases quickly produced results. Several federal district judges denied jury trials in cases that they
determined were too complicated for a jury to decide. 9 1 will assume that
the reader is familiar with the general history of the complexity cases and
the accompanying law review literature. I will only summarize the highlights and discuss those developments important to the subject of this article. Of most interest here are the development and application of the lawequity historical test, the development of the due process argument for the
complexity exception, and the emergence of the nullification argument.
This article makes no attempt to define a complex case or to categorize
any particular case as too complex or not. The very existence of the complexity debate and the conflicting conclusions drawn by judges and commentators makes it clear that there is a serious problem in the way federal
courts handle certain complicated cases, however "complex" is defined.
A.

The Law-Equity HistoricalTest

The first argument in the complexity debate was that actions too complicated for a jury should be considered equitable actions under the lawequity historical test, thus eliminating any constitutional right to jury
trial. 10 This was the first time the issue of the jury's performance had been
such a central issue in the law-equity historical test. The argument is that
the weakness of jury trial was an accepted ground for equity jurisdiction
in 1791, and that modem complex cases are analogous to actions heard by
equity in 1791. This argument has been buttressed by the claim that the
Supreme Court, in Ross v. Bernhard,11 held that courts could weigh the
ability of the jury as a factor in determining whether a particular case was
legal or equitable. Despite the unprecedented efforts by the proponents of
the argument to find historical evidence in support of the argument, it has
been rejected by two courts of appeals. 12
The argument that Ross recognized jury weakness as a ground of equity
jurisdiction requires brief mention, even though most judges have been
9. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United States Fin.
Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99
(W.D. Wash. 1976).
10. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 3, at 29-37.
11. 396U.S.531,538n.10(1970).
12. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080-83 (3d Cir. 1980); In re
United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411,419-24 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v.
Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
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unpersuaded by it. The Ross argument is based on footnote ten of the
opinion, which states:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of

juries.

13

Some proponents of the complexity exception read the third item in footnote ten as the Court's blessing for creating the complexity exception.
The better-reasoned opinions have refused to so read the footnote, as the
Court gave no hint that the footnote was intended to announce a revision
of the historical test and never applied footnote ten to any later seventh
amendment case. In fact, in Curtis v. Loether, the Court held that policy
arguments about how well the jury could perform its role were "insuffi4
cient to overcome the clear command of the Seventh Amendment."'
Reliance on footnote ten demonstrates a lack of true respect for the seventh amendment as a constitutional provision. The Supreme Court could
eliminate the right to jury trial in a new category of cases in such a cursory manner only if it did not consider the amendment very important.
Although commentators have consistently concluded that the division
of jurisdiction between law and equity in 1791 was the result of historical
accident,15 much effort has been spent on attempts to find precedent establishing that the ability of the jury was a factor in deciding which claims
were legal and which were equitable. Proponents of the complexity exception have presented three arguments for considering complex cases
under equity jurisdiction. These are, first, that complex cases are analogous to accounting actions over which equity had jurisdiction; second,
that equity had a general jurisdiction over cases not suited for jury trial;
and third, that the Chancellor in 1791 had power to control the flow of
litigation and would have sent such complex cases into equity if any had
16
arisen.
The first argument, based on accounting jurisdiction, developed into
ever-lengthening discussions of the relative jurisdictions of law and
equity in accounting actions. 17 At the moment, it appears accepted that a
13. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,538 n. 10 (1970).
14. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974).
15. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 344 (1965); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 731 (1973).
16.
17.

See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080-83 (1980).
Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 907-14

(E.D. Pa. 1979) (rejecting motion for jury trial in complex litigation), vacated sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), with Bernstein v. Universal Pictures,
Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting motion for jury trial in complex litigation).
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complex case is not an equitable action of account and that, in any event,
equity did not have exclusive jurisdiction over actions of account. 18 The
second argument, based on a general equity jurisdiction over complex
lawsuits, has rapidly become a narrow battle over relatively few and often
obscure cases; at the moment we know more about a few lines in a 1603
notebook than will ever be useful. 19 This argument has not been accepted
by either the Ninth Circuit or the Third Circuit. 20 Both this and the accounting argument seek to analogize the modem complexity cases to
cases falling under equity jurisdiction in 1791; they fail because the analogies to common-law jurisdiction are at least as good and the precedent
for equity jurisdiction over such cases is sparse.
The third argument, based on the 1791 power of the Chancellor, although more sophisticated, has also been unsuccessful. The argument apparently was developed by Lord Devlin, an English judge. 2 1 He was commissioned by IBM, a frequent defendant in complex cases, to develop an
historical argument in support of the complexity exception. He concluded
that if a modem complex case had arisen in 1791, the Chancellor would
have used his power to control the jurisdiction of the courts to prevent a
jury trial in the law courts. Lord Devlin's conclusion has not persuaded
the courts of appeals for several reasons. First, it depends upon a fair
amount of conjecture about what might have happened, and second, the
novelty of his conclusion is made more suspect by his English perspective. It is, after all, an American constitution we are interpreting with the
historical test. The right to jury trial and the power of the equity courts
were political issues when the seventh amendment was adopted. 22 Lord
Devlin's conclusion that equity in 1791 had this unused power to eliminate trial by jury because of the inabilities of jurors clashes with the political history of the seventh amendment, and he offers no reconciliation of
the two. This is illustrated by his brief explanation for the use of Irish
Chancery precedent, where recent American legal history would call for a
fuller defense. 23 Finally, Lord Devlin's conclusion is undercut by his ef18. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080-81 (3d Cir. 1980) (vacating Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
19. See the discussion of Clench v. Tomley, Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603) in Arnold,
supra note 3, at 840-45; Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 3, at 974-85; and Arnold, A Modest
Replicationto aLengthy Discourse, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 986, 987-88 (1980).
20. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411,423-24 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631
F.2d 1069, 108 1-83 (3d Cir. 1980).
21. Devlin, supranote 3.
22. See Arnold, supra note 3, at 830-40; Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 3, at 966-73;
Wolfram, supranote 13. Compare P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 12-13 (1956) (discussing the English
history of judge-jury relations).
23. Lord Devlin justifies his quotation of Irish precedent with only this footnote: "[L]aw and
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fort to make all arguments support equity jurisdiction under the lawequity historical test even though some of the supporting material is based
on the historical development of the judge-jury relationship in the law
courts. 24 The use of the judge-jury historical material illustrates both the

weakness and value of his work. The weakness is the underlying assumption that the only solution for the complexity cases is equity jurisdiction.
That assumption removes the need fully to define the role of the civil jury
and appears to make evidence that judges controlled juries supportive of
his conclusion. The value is that the judge-jury history developed in this
recent work and in his earlier book 25 contributes to better understanding
of the judge-jury historical test.
A tremendous amount of effort has been devoted to the law-equity historical test. Although this part of the debate has been fought to a draw, the
effort was not totally wasted because it has shown that this is the wrong
place to seek a solution to the complexity problem. Perhaps it has also
demonstrated the futility of strict historicism as an approach to defining
the role of the jury. It seems incredible that application of the seventh
amendment to modem problems should depend on what one judge may
have said in 1603.
B.

The Due ProcessClause

The newer argument for a complexity exception is that allowing a civil
jury to decide complex cases violates the due process protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment. 26 The argument is that due process requires
a decision maker who can decide on the basis of the legal rules and evidence presented, and some cases may be too complicated for a jury to be
able to understand the law and evidence. 27 The Third Circuit, in Japanese
Electronic Products, accepted this framing of the issue and held that
"due process precludes trial by jury when ajury will be unable to perform
procedure in Ireland were the same as in England. With rare exceptions the Lord Chancellors of
Ireland were English lawyers." Devlin. supra note 3, at 56 n.40. Reid suggests that the Irish experience is not at all helpful in interpreting an American constitution. J. REID. IN A DEFIANT STANCE: THE
CONDITIONS OF LAW IN MASSACHusErrs BAY. THE IRISH COMPARISON. ANDTHE COItNG OF THE AIERI-

REVOLUTION (1977). See also, Teachout, Book Review, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241. 254 (1978).
Also compare Lord Devlin's report of one English judge's "horror at the idea of a judge taking as
much as a fortnight over one case." Devlin, supra note 3. at 67 n.89. with the contrasting American
experience in Vanhorne v. Dorrance. 2 Dall. 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795), in which the trial continued for
CAN

15 days.

24.
25.
26.
liberty,
27.

Devlin, supra note 3. at 83-85.
P. DEVLIN, supra note 22. See also P. DEVLIN. THE JUDGE 117-76 (1979).
The fifth amendment provides in part: -[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life.
or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V
See. e.g.. Lynch. supra note 3, at 18-19

The Jury and Complex Cases
[its] task with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal
rules. "28
Basing the complexity exception on the fifth amendment appears more
defensible than basing it on the law-equity test because the fifth and seventh amendments are of equal authority. Consequently, a court applying
this standard is not weakening a constitutional protection for policy reasons but is reaching an accommodation of conflicting constitutional provisions.
This due process argument for the complexity exception, however, is
based on a false conflict between the two amendments. As argued by
Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Japanese Electronic Products,29 the due
process argument is based on the assumption that complex litigation must
be as complicated as it currently is. Yet, one major cause of complexity is
the liberal federal rules on joinder of claims and parties. 30 While there is a
strong policy argument that it is most efficient to have the joinder provisions of the federal rules, such joinder does not appear essential to allow
litigation of disputes and certainly the joinder rules are not mandated by
the due process clause. Therefore, the conflict is really between federal
procedural rules and the seventh amendment and not between the two
amendments. The first step should be to divide the complex case into separate issues with fewer parties in each action and then determine whether
the smaller actions are still too complex for ajury to handle competently.
A second flaw in the argument that using a jury may violate due process is that those making the argument fail to explain why only the jury is
considered a source of the problem. In JapaneseElectronicProducts, the
Third Circuit implicitly assumed that the amount and incomprehensibility
of the evidence was a necessary given and that the complexity of the issues decided by the jury was foreordained. Basically, it assumed that the
only solution was eliminating the jury. If instead we view the jury as an
instrument of legal procedure, then it is clear that there are other elements
of the process that may be the primary cause of the problem. Lawyers
may present too much evidence or may present it improperly. The judge
may admit too much evidence or may instruct the jury in a manner technically correct but practically incomprehensible. The law permitting introduction of the evidence and requiring the jury instruction may itself be
uncertain or contradictory. The jury's province is defined by the judges;
28. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980).
29. Id. at 1091-92. See also In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 428 n.58 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (joinder of claims and remedies); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (joinder of persons
needed for just adjudication); FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties); FED. R. Cv. P. 21
(misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties); FED. R. Cv. P. 22 (interpleader).
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the jury may be expected to perform a task that is too complicated as a
whole, even though it could perform substantial portions of it if properly
handled.
The Third Circuit and other proponents of the complexity exception
have assumed that there is no middle ground between continuing to allow
the jury to be overwhelmed and eliminating the jury. The bold step of
holding that due process requires a complexity exception avoids the strict
historicism of the equitable jurisdiction argument by swinging fully to the
other extreme. There is no precedent to provide guidance on when a jury
trial violates due process. The due process argument simply goes too far
and creates a serious "slippery slope" problem.
The only way to develop limits on a due-process-based complexity exception will be by analogy to the historical development of the judge-jury
relation. But reasoning by analogy would be a two-step process, which
can be needlessly complicated and potentially misleading. It would seem
preferable to attack the problem issue by issue under the judge-jury historical test instead of trying to determine when the entire case is too complicated.
C.

The NullificationRole of the Jury

Initial opposition to the creation of a complexity exception focused on
the weakness of arguments based on the law-equity historical test. As the
debate continued, there was some discussion of the proper definition of
the jury's role and disagreement about that definition. The proponents of
the complexity exception argued that, in complex cases, the jury cannot
perform its role of accurate factfinding and logical application of the law
to the facts. 3' Opponents of the complexity exception responded with either a reaffirmation that the jury can understand even the most complex
cases 32 or a definition that emphasizes the political role of the jury. 33 The
reaffirmation of the jury's understanding and ability is unlikely to stand as
a firm defense even if major litigation gets no more complicated than it
now is. If the length and complexity of the cases continue to increase, this
reaffirmation will appear increasingly hollow. The problem with this asserted confidence in the ability of the jury is that there is no attempt to
explain what the jury's role is or why we should believe it is performing
its role correctly.

31.
32.

See supra text accompanying note 28.
In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411,429-32 (9th Cir. 1979). cert. denied sub

nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
33.

See infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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The argument for the political role of the jury is a challenge to the basic
assumption that the role of the civil jury is limited to finding facts and
applying the law. Among the better-known advocates of the political role
are two federal district court judges, Judge Higginbotham of Texas 34 and
Judge Becker of Pennsylvania. 35 Their argument is that the jury allows
the courts to deliver individualized justice, a role they term the "black
box" function, 36 and that the jury provides a needed check on judicial
power. 37 The explanation of the "black box" function is based on the
assertion that the formal law is sometimes too devoted to uniform rules;
the general verdict of a jury is valuable because it allows the jury to do
equity by reaching results at variance with the law without creating a precedent to upset legal uniformity, thus allowing actual decisions to reflect
community attitudes.
Both the "black box" label and that explanation of the role of the jury
are unfortunately wrongly chosen. Proponents of the complexity exception have responded that many cases are so complicated that the jury does
not understand them well enough to return a verdict consistent with community values, 38 unless community values means nothing more than unreasoned prejudice for or against certain parties. Given the complexity of
current antitrust and securities law, it is simply impossible to argue that
the six members of a federal civil jury understand both the law and the
community view so that its verdict will provide a "contemporaneous expression of the community values that bear on the issues in each case.' 39
As so far articulated by Judges Higginbotham and Becker, the "black
box" function in complexity cases describes not a source of rough community justice but a random number generator in which the verdict is a
product of random chance. A random number generator is a "black
box," but it is hardly a means of deciding law suits consistent with due
process.
The nullification argument also is a product of a strict historicism. It
elevates the ratification debates to central importance in interpreting the
seventh amendment and appears to accept the positions stated in 1787-88
literally and uncritically. 40 Even though the ratification debates reflect
34. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of JudicialPower,
56 Tax. L. REv. 47 (1977); Higginbotham, PanelDiscussion on ProposedIncreasedJudicialPretrialand TrialManagement: CanIt Work?, 48 ANT'RusT L. J. 525,532-34 (1980).
35. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 934-42 (E.D. Pa.
1979), vacatedsub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
36. 478 F. Supp. at 938.
37. Id. at 941-42.
38. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1085 (3d Cir. 1980).
Lynch, supranote 3, at 24-26.
39. Higginbotham, supranote 34, at 58.
40. An example of the use of the Constitution ratification debates appears in Zenith Radio Corp.
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and support a certain political role for the American jury, such strict historicism has been generally rejected because the judge-jury historical test
supports a much more sophisticated definition of the jury's role. The
nullification argument has some value as a reminder of the American
jury's political role. but it will not long be a defensible position in the
complexity debate.
II.

THE JUDGE-JURY HISTORICAL TEST

An often-stated interpretation of the seventh amendment is that the language requires an historical test based on the English legal practice of
1791.41 The historical test is not a unitary test. One historical test is applied to determine whether an action or an issue in an action is legal or
equitable, while another is used to evaluate whether procedural devices
that affect the judge-jury relation are consistent with the seventh amendment. 42 Roughly stated, the law-equity historical test defines whether a
jury is available, while the judge-jury historical test defines the role of the
jury if it is available.
The law-equity historical test has been developed in the recent line of
43
Supreme Court cases that includes Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
46
45
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 44 Katchen v. Landy, Ross v. Bernhard,
Curtis v. Loether,47 and Pernell v. Southall Realy. 48 In such cases the
right to jury trial depends on the classification of an action or issue as
legal instead of equitable. The historical inquiry is focused on the jurisdictional lines that separated law and equity in 1791. 49 There is little discussion of the ability of the jury or the value or disadvantages of jury trial,
and consequently there is little explicit discussion of the role of the jury.
The judge-jury historical test has been developed in such Supreme Court
cases as Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 50 Dimick v.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 938-41 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (citing Wolfram. supra
note 13), vacatedsub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
41. See Wolfram. supra note 15, at 639-44.
42. There is also a related historical test that was used by the Court to determine whether the
denial of a jury trial that resulted from use of a nonjudicial forum violated the seventh amendment.
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n. 430 U.S. 442 (19771. See
infra note 168.
43. 359 U.S. 500(1959).
44. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
45. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
46. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
47. 415 U.S. 189(1974).
48. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
49.

See generally Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recogni:e the

Seventh Amendment Right. 58 TEX. L. REV. 549. 561-73 (1980).
50. 283U.S.494(1931).
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Schiedt,5 1 Baltimore & CarolinaLine, Inc. v. Redman, 52 Galloway v.
United States,53 and ParklaneHosiery v. Shore.54 In these cases, the legal nature of the action is conceded and the issue is whether a particular
procedural device developed after 1791 so affects the civil jury's role of
"historic domain" 55 that it is inconsistent with the seventh amendment.
The historical inquiry in these cases is focused on the role of the jury and
the relationship between judge and jury. Although the role of the jury is
often assumed or implied in the discussion rather than explicitly defined,
the mandate to "preserve the basic institution of jury trial in its most fundamental elements" 56 requires attention to the proper role of the jury.
The massive efforts to find a basis for a complexity exception under the
law-equity historical test were a product of both the greater attention to
the law-equity test since Beacon Theatres and the apparent merger of both
lines of precedent in the Supreme Court's recent opinion, ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore. 57 In many cases this merger may cause no harm, as the
two historical tests are related. Nevertheless, each historical test is particularly applicable to certain problems, and application of each requires
close attention to different sorts of history. For the law-equity historical
test, the relevant history is the development of the jurisdiction of the common law courts and their rivals. For the judge-jury historical test, the relevant history is the interrelation of the judge and jury in both the English
common-law courts and in American courts as uniquely affected by the
American Revolution.
A.

HistoricalDevelopment of the Role of the American Jury

Although the seventh amendment declares that the right of jury trial
shall be preserved, it is wrong to think of jury trial as an object that can be
preserved as a museum would preserve a piece of colonial furniture. Jury
trial is more accurately seen as a political process, with power and re58
sponsibility shared by both judges and jurors.
Preserving a political process is far more difficult than preserving a
concrete object. Fixed and final answers are hard to find, and sensitive
51. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
52. 295 U.S. 654(1935).
53. 319 U.S. 372(1943).
54. 439 U.S. 322(1979).
55. Id. at 336.
56. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
57. 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979). Various commentators also implied that only the law-equity
historical test could be used to limit the role of the jury. See, e.g.. F. JAMES, supra note 15, at
377-81; Wolfram, supra note 15, at 731-47.
58. F. JAMES, supranote 15, at 240.
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interpretation of history is necessary for developing useful guidelines.
But even though there will be flexibiltity, there can be widely accepted
constitutional limits. The relative powers of and interrelations between
Congress and the President, for example, are part of a political process
that has changed many times over two centuries, but constitutional limits
on each still exist.
The relative power and responsibility of judges and jurors have also
changed over two centuries, but it is still possible to determine seventh
amendment limits on the powers of each. It is misleading to consider any
particular procedural step in isolation; correct interpretation of the amendment requires consideration of the entire judge-jury relation. The historical development of the civil jury is important because the jury trial preserved by the seventh amendment was a political process that was
undergoing change in 1791 and that has continued to change up to the
present.
The civil jury we inherited developed during several centuries as a part
of the procedure used in the common-law courts of England. 59 The body
that eventually became the jury began as a group of local residents who
knew at least some of the facts of the dispute before the trial. The jurors
returned a verdict based on what they knew, what they were told before
trial, and what they were told at trial. The early juror was both a witness
and a judge of facts, and a jury verdict was much like a group declaration
60
of what the facts were.
The earliest means of correcting a wrong verdict was the attaint, a procedure based on the assumption that the jury had willfully returned a false
verdict. 6' The attaint was analogous to a prosecution of the jury for perjury. In the attaint, the original parties and the first jury were parties in a
trial before a larger jury. If the attaint jury found a different verdict, the
first judgment was reversed and the first jury was convicted and punished.
The attaint was a crude and cumbersome jury-control device. It became
illogical as the jury began to depend less on its own prior knowledge and
increasingly became a factfinder listening to evidence at trial. The attaint
was eventually replaced by the more direct means of jury control of fining
and imprisoning a jury that returned a verdict that the judge thought
wrong. 62 In the common-law courts it seems the jury would be punished
only if it refused to return the verdict that the judge said was proper. This
See generally 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 298-350 (7th ed. 1956): F.
15. 237-48; J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 137-262 (1898).
59.

JAMES. supra note

60.
61.
62.

1 W. HOLDSWORTH. supra note 59. at 317.
J. THAYER, supra note 59, at 140-55.
Id. at 160-66:1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 341-46.
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was an early form of a directed verdict, and a directed verdict with real
teeth. 63 Perhaps because it was too direct, the power of punishing jurors
was disputed. The power ended in 1670 with the opinion in Bushel's
Case,64 a well-known habeas corpus action brought by the jurors who had
acquitted William Penn and William Mead.
During the next century, the English judges created and refined a number of other jury-control devices to replace the attaint and fine. The jury
was not allowed unrestrained power to decide all cases, so there was still
the problem of how to guide or control the jury to prevent incorrect verdicts. There were three types of procedures: one type removed the jury as
a factfinder, one reviewed what the jury did, and one guided the jury.
The two procedures that most clearly removed the jury as a factfinder
were the demurrer to the evidence and the nonsuit. The party demurring
to the evidence admitted the truth of the other's allegations and proof and
asserted that on such facts the law clearly required judgment for the demurring party. 65 Although the procedure had limited effectiveness because the demurring party had to admit all adverse factual inferences and
thus gave up the right to offer contrary evidence, the use of the demurrer
to the evidence did establish that the judge could determine if there was a
factual issue for the jury to decide. The true nonsuit likewise had limited
66
effectiveness, but it also required that the judge evaluate the evidence.
A defendant who thought that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient
could move at the end of the plaintiff's case that the plaintiff be nonsuited. If the motion was denied, the defendant could still offer evidence, so
the risks to the defendant were not as great as in the demurrer to the evidence. The benefits, however, were not as great either, as the nonsuit
required the plaintiff's agreement. Although plaintiffs would often agree
to the nonsuit to avoid other actions the judge might take, some plaintiffs
67
refused to agree and insisted on ajury verdict.
Several other procedures kept the casd or particular issues in the case
from the jury without requiring judicial evaluation of the evidence. The
intricacies of common-law pleading, with the quest for a single issue and
with doctrines such as color, often allowed the lawyers to frame the issues
so that the judge would decide the whole case. 68 At trial, the rules on
63. The practice of fining was first used by Star Chamber to punish corrupt jurors after the trial
was ended. Star Chamber was abolished in 1641 and after the Restoration the common law courts
exercised the power of fining. 1W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 343-44.
64. Vaughn, 135, 124Eng. Rep. 1006(C.P. 1670).
65. J. THAYER, supra note 59, at 234-39.
66. F. JAMES, supra note 15, at 244-45.
67. See Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T.R. 172, 99 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1786); Watkins v. Towers, 2T.R. 276, 100 Eng. Rep. 150, 153 (K.B. 1788).
68. J. THAYER, supranote 59, at 114-15, 232-34.
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admissibility of evidence, burden of proof, and presumptions limited
which evidence the jury heard or the effect of the evidence. 69 Special verdicts were used to remove factual disputes and leave the real decision to
the judge as a matter of law. 70 Although none of these procedures gave
the judge full power to control the jury, as the facts of the case might
preclude their use or counsel might not consent, together they often eliminated the jury's general verdict.
With the end of fining jurors in 1670, the common-law courts had to
develop some procedure for handling an incorrect verdict, not only to
maintain certainty in the law but to defend their jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the losing party would try to upset the verdict by an equity action. 71 One
procedure that gradually developed was a motion for a new trial. After the
jury returned a verdict, the judge could review its action on a motion for a
new trial. 72 When the reason for the motion was that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, the judge had to evaluate the evidence. The practice of granting a new trial when the verdict was against
73
the evidence was used as early as 1655.
The grant of a new trial because the verdict was against the evidence
was a bold step when first taken because the judges had to consider directly whether the jury had performed its role correctly. 74 The grant of a
new trial was not as direct as fining the jury, nor did it give the judge as
much power because a second jury still had to return a verdict. Still, it did
establish that the judges had a way to supervise and control jury verdicts.
Of course, controlling the jury by granting a new trial is indirect and
creates delay, so English judges eventually took more direct steps to
guide the jury. The judges had for a long time instructed the jury in a
charge that included both law and comments on the facts. When it was
clear that one party had to lose because that party had introduced no evidence, the judges would direct the jury to return a verdict for the other
party. 75 Again, the procedure had its limitations, for it could be used only
if there were no evidence presented on an element of the action. Also, the
jury still had to formally find the verdict that it was directed to reach.
Fines were no longer permitted, so a stubborn jury could not be forced to
follow the direction, but the judge could always grant a new trial and thus
avoid the incorrect verdict.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

Id. at 212-16.
Id. at217-19.
Id. at 172-74n.4.
Id. at169-79.
Wood and Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655).
J. THAYER, supra note 59. at 169.

F.

JAMES,

supra note 15, at 245.
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Finally, there were certain procedures used after the trial that could
negate a jury verdict, although in theory they did not require the judge to
review the jury's action. These were the defendant's motion to arrest
judgment and thd plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Both motions raised the issue of whether the pleadings permitted
judgment for the party who had won the verdict. On such motions the
court might nonsuit the plaintiff, enter judgment for the plaintiff, or
award a new trial.
Common-law procedures such as the nonsuit, demurrer to the evidence, directed verdict, and new trial seem to have been generally used in
the colonial and early state courts. 76 There was great variety, however, as
all the jury-control procedures were still evolving in the English courts
and probably in no colony was English procedure copied exactly. More
importantly, the power of the civil jury became a political issue in the
revolutionary period and thereafter, and political events had some impact
on the evolution of these jury-control procedures in the federal courts.
During the decades before the Declaration of Independence, the colonists learned that a colonial jury could effectively nullify the enforcement
of unpopular British laws. 77 Colonial juries hostile to the Trade Acts returned verdicts that exonerated smugglers and imposed civil liability on
royal officers for enforcing those statutes. Since the judges did not have
enough power to control such juries, such cases were transferred to new
admiralty courts sitting without juries. 78 The colonists also saw that the
colonial chancery courts sitting without juries were not vulnerable to the
nullification power of the jury. 79 The nonjury procedure of equity and
admiralty was seen as an instrument of tyranny, and by 1787 the political
role of the jury had become strongly established. The civil jury was said
to be a source of natural justice that was better than the formal law applied
by judges, and the jury was praised as a shield protecting citizens against
80
unpopular government policy.
The role and power of the civil jury became an issue in the debates over
ratification of the Constitution. 81 Opposition to the Crown and to the
76. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 300,
318-20 (1966).
77. See J. REID, supranote 23; J. REID, IN A REBELLIOUS SPIRIT (1979).
78. C. UBBELOHDE, THE VICE ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960); see 4
C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 168-71,254-69 (1938).

79.

See generally Arnold, supra note 3, at 830-38 (discussing the historical relationship of

equity and jury trial).

80. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Wolfram, supra note 15, at 667-725. See also Kirst, AdministrativePenaltiesand the Civil
Jury: The Supreme Court'sAssault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1322-28
(1978) (discussing the development of the jury's role in tax cases).
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Trade Acts was replaced by reluctance to repay British creditors and fear
of the unknown evils that would be created by the new federal government. The civil jury was proposed as a protective device, with the hope
that local juries would nullify the treaty guarantees for British creditors
and protect local citizens against abuses by federal officers. The ratification controversy led to the Bill of Rights as an answer to the fears voiced
by the anti-Federalists. As a result, the original understanding of the seventh amendment included a strong flavor of a nullification role for the
civil jury.
For nullification to be effective, the parties must be able to insist on a
jury verdict, and the jury must be free of judicial control and able to return a general verdict that must be accepted. Freedom for judicial control
means that the jury is free to ignore the law given in the instructions and
to follow instead a better natural law. Such a position is clearly seen in the
early Supreme Court case of Georgia v. Brailsford,82 in which the jury
was told that it was not bound to follow the law stated by the court.
Some observers appear to consider the jury's power seen in Georgia v.
Brailsford as the only correct interpretation of the seventh amendment
and, therefore, view of the development of modem jury-control devices
as a continuous and improper usurpation of power by judges. 83 An opposing group tends to view the nullification history as a mistaken excess to be
ignored or minimized. 84 Both positions are too inflexible. Ignoring the
nullification roots of the seventh amendment does not eliminate them;
they keep returning, as in recent cases. Accepting the nullification roots
as controlling ignores other aids for interpreting the seventh amendment
and overemphasizes the value of a brief period in the history of the civil
jury. Debate over the meaning of the seventh amendment has suffered
from an absence of attention to the current significance of the original
85
intent.
The surviving evidence for the nullification interpretation is well canvassed by Professor Wolfram's review of the ratification debates. 86 Those
debates, however, were political rhetoric and included a fair amount of
overstatement and hyperbole. The predominant concern with the single
82.
83.

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1,3 (1794).
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322. 339 (1979) (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting):

Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372. 405 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting): M. HOROWITZ. THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 28-29, 141-43 (1977): Johnston, Jury Subordination Through

Judicial Control. 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980. at 24.
84. See J. THAYER, supra note 59, at 253-56.
85. The substantial attention to the original intent of the fourteenth amendment provides a strong
contrast. See generally Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981 ) (dis-

cussing constitutional interpretation not only by consideration of original intent but also by constderation of -the entirety of our history").
86. Wolfram. supra note 15.

The Jury and Complex Cases
topic of debts owed to British creditors is not surprising, since those
creditors were one of the groups expected to use the alienage jurisdiction
of the new federal courts. This was a highly visible political issue, and it
should be expected that the earlier political use of the jury would be recalled. But political speeches are not a good source of information about
the role of the jury in the full variety of cases on the courts' dockets.
The nullification roots must be placed in perspective because other evidence indicates that various jury-control devices then in use in many state
courts restricted juries and prevented the nullification that was described. 87 The new federal courts began to use a variety of jury-control
devices soon after 1789.88 Even on the highly visible issue of debts owed
to British creditors, the federal courts entered many judgments without an
89
outbreak of nullification.
These nullification roots cannot be given determinative weight in interpreting the seventh amendment because they are based on false premises.
The nullification-natural-law argument assumes that there will be a
coherent and consistent set of community values, an assumption that is
only partially true for the visible political issues and that is not at all true
for the countless routine matters tried by courts. 90 The idea of constitutional government and due process of law requires some consistency in
the application of the law as well as equal treatment of all litigants. The
idea that all British creditors should lose, solely because of their status, is
hard to justify as due process; whatever justification might be possible
cannot be extended to many other kinds of cases. It was inevitable, as the
population grew and as lawsuits became more complex, that judges
would have to continue to use jury-control procedures, and even to refine

87. Henderson, supra note 76.
88. Id. The Henderson article discusses only reported opinions, and is therefore unable to account for the practice in every state or in the various federal trial courts. Some early federal court
Minutes are available. A review of the Minutes for the Circuit Court for New York indicates that this
federal court made use of some of the jury control devices. For example, in the second civil trial held
by the court, the plaintiff was nonsuited. Culbertson v. Godet, Minutes of the U.S. Circuit Court for
the District of New York, Sept. 5, 1795 (National Archives Microfilm, Record Group 21, M854).
The motion for a new trial was in use, although-the grounds are not stated. Bowen v. Kemble, Sept.
4, 1804, id.; Parsons v. Barnard, April 8, 1813, id. The directed verdict was in use, Jackson v.
Stiley, April 3, 1815, id., as was the special verdict, Lanefae v. Barker, April 11, 1815, id. See also
United States v. Giles, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 210 (1815) (appeal from Circuit Court for District of New
York, jury found special verdict). The directed verdict was also in use in the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Pennsylvania. Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
89. See D. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 77-82, 89 (1971).
90. See R. McBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTiNG THE JURY § 1.08A (Supp. 1978). See also Reid,
In the Taught Tradition-The Meaning of Law in Massachusetts-BayTwo-Hundred Years Ago, 14
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 931, 956-57, 968-74 (1980).
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or expand the procedures that had been developed in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. 91
The nullification roots of the seventh amendment need not be totally
ignored. Even though the original case for nullification may have been
based on crass and immediate motives that were not fully examined, there
was also a nobler goal of maximizing citizen participation in the courts.
That goal does not have to conflict with consistent, fair application of the
law to all parties, even though there is clearly tension between them. The
seventh amendment requires judges to develop and use jury-control procedures that minimize this tension.
B.

The HistoricalTest andModern Procedure

As the modem jury-control devices evolved in the nineteenth century,
there were several occasions on which the constitutionality of a particular
procedure was debated. The Supreme Court refused to allow an involuntary nonsuit 92 or to direct appellate review of the jury's factfinding, 93 but
permitted directed verdicts 94 and new trials on the weight of the evi-

dence. 95 The trend in the nineteenth century was one of gradual refinement of jury-control devices, a trend clearly reflected in the firm rejection
96
of the nullification doctrine at the end of the century.
The modem jury-control devices of summary judgment, directed verdict, new trial, partial new trial, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict have all been upheld, often over strongly argued constitutional objections. The cases reflect a clear contrast between two standards for
interpreting the seventh amendment. The dominant standard followed by
the Supreme Court requires full consideration of the history of the judge91.
The story of Massachusetts developments is told in Note, The Changing Role of the Jur.y in
the Nineteenth Centur. 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964). See also R. ELLIS. THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS
184-206 (1971); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATtON OF AMERICAN LAW 28-29. 140-59 (1977): W.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMsON LAW 165-74 (1975): Cooper, Directions for Directed
Verdicts: A CompassforFederal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903. 912-16 (1971). But see Teachout.

supra note 23, at 274-75.
92. Elmore v. Grymes, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 469 (1828): D'Wolf v. Rabaud. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 476.
497 (1828).
93. Parsons v. Bedford. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
94. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362 (1850): M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 170.
182 (1828). The practice appears, without objection, as early as Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy. 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 173 (1809). See also Oscanyon v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261. 264
(1881) ("Involuntary nonsuits not being allowed in the Federal Courts, the course adopted [of a
directed verdict] was the proper proceeding. ").
95. Actually, there was almost no debate about the power to grant a new trial. See Walker v.
New Mexico & S.P.R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897); Parsons v. Bedford. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433.
448-49 (1830).
96. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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jury relationship to preserve the fundamental elements of jury trial. The
other standard, at times followed but most often rejected, requires examination of each procedure in isolation as an exercise in strict historicism.
The classic opinion, which well illustrates the difference between considering the full history and considering only a particular procedure, is
Galloway v. United States. 97 Galloway has retained its primary importance because the directed verdict considered there is the most obvious
jury-control device, and because of the well-written dissent of Justice
Black.
The Galloway opinion can be easily misunderstood. Justice Black
argued in dissent that each of the 1791 jury-control procedures had limits
or risks to a party, and that there should be no modem procedure that
more effectively controlled the jury. His dissent implies that strict historicism is the only legitimate standard for interpreting the seventh-amendment because he argued that each particular procedure had to be considered separately. The eloquence of his argument makes it easy to assume
that the majority opinion should be so evaluated, a tendency further enhanced today by the substantial attention in the law-equity historical test
cases to the details of the jurisdiction exercised in 1791.98
It would be wrong to read Galloway as adopting such a narrow interpretation because Justice Rutledge's opinion ignores strict historicism and
establishes the constitutionality of the directed verdict by examining the
full history of the judge-jury relationship. Both the flexibility and limits
of the judge-jury historical test are well set out:
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural
incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any
more than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific
rules of evidence then prevailing. Nor were the "rules of the common law"
then prevalent, including those relating to the procedure by which the judge
regulated the jury's role on questions of fact', crystallized in a fixed and
immutable system ....
. * .The more logical conclusion, we think, and the one which both
history and the previous decisions here support, is that the Amendment was
designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial only in its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions. 99
The particular procedures used in 1791 were not of individual impor97. 319 U.S. 372(1943).
98. An example that shows the effect of such uncertainty about the correct interpretation of Galloway is Cooper, DirectionsforDirected Verdicts:A Compassfor FederalCourts, 55 MINN. L. REV.
903, 916-17 (1971).
99. 319 U.S. at 390-92.
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tance; what was important was that the judge controlled the jury's factfinding role. The jury's province in 1942 did not extend to mere speculation or drawing unreasonable inferences, and thus the judge could
determine whether there was enough evidence to go to the jury, as judges
had done in 1791.
The Supreme Court had similarly considered the jury's historic role
when it earlier upheld the constitutionality of summary judgment. 00
Summary judgment was unknown to the common law, but the Court held
that it was permitted under the seventh amendment because it was a procedure for determining if there was a factual issue for the jury to decide.
The Court properly assumed that it was clear that the jury had no role if
there were no issue of fact to decide. The standard for modem summary
judgment is analogous to that for the old demurrer to the evidence, but the
Court avoided historicism and made no effort to equate summary judgment with any 1791 analogue. 101
Not all modem procedures were so easily upheld against constitutional
challenge. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was at first rejected in an
opinion that followed the strict-historicism interpretation. 102 The opinion
compared the judgment n.o.v. with several 1791 procedures and found
that it differed from each. As the full history of the jury's role was ignored, the opinion was inconsistent, asserting that only a jury verdict
would do while conceding that there could be a binding directed verdict. 103 The dissent of four Justices was centered on the general role of the
jury and judicial control of the jury and was not tied to a particular common-law procedure. 104 That dissenting view eventually prevailed twentytwo years later when the Supreme Court upheld the judgment n.o.v. by
analogizing it to the common-law practice of reserving a legal point for
decision after the verdict. 105 This time the issue was briefly discussed,
without dissent. The analogy to the common-law practice was more a
verbal formula for distinguishing the prior decision than an exercise in
strict historicism. 106

The grant of a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence was never a matter of serious debate because of
the solid common-law roots of that procedure. 107 Granting a new trial on
100.

101.
322, 349
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902).

A contrary suggestion by Justice Rehnquist in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 439 U.S.
(1979) (dissenting). is not supported by Justice McKenna's Fidelity & Deposit Co. opinion.
Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 228 U.S. 364 (1912).
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 400.
Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
See F. JANIES, supra note 15, at 333 & n. 11.
See supra note 95.
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some of the issues was upheld, even though it appeared that common-law
procedure required a full new trial. 108 The strict historicism was rejected
on the assumption that, if employed in a case with separate and distinct
issues, it would not infringe on the jury's role. However, the new trial
conditioned on additur did not survive a constitutional challenge in Dimick v. Schiedt, 109 an opinion that followed the strict historicism analysis
and examined each common-law procedure. The Dimick opinion has
never been well received, as the distinction between the forbidden additur
and the concededly valid remittitur" 0 is hard to accept. This point was
made by the dissenters, who again took the fuller view of judicial control
of the jury's factfinding. 11'
The Supreme Court most recently rejected strict historicism as the standard of interpretation for the judge-jury test in 1979 in ParklaneHosiery
2
There the Court upheld offensive collateral estoppel in
Co. v. Shore. 11
the absence of mutuality in a law action even though the estoppel came
from a judgment in a prior equity action, thus eliminating any jury trial on
the facts. The Court relied on the "fundamental elements" language of
Galloway 13 and rejected the argument that collateral estoppel was limited by 1791 practice. The lengthy dissent of Justice Rehnquist demonstrates, however, that strict historicism still retains some appeal as a standard of interpretation for procedural changes that affect the role of the
4 The persistent appeal of strict historicism, seen also in the comjury. 11
plexity debate, requires that there be further attention to its inadequacy as
a tool for constitutional interpretation.
No matter how fervently one tries to ban any greater limitation on the
province of the jury than was known in 1791, it cannot be done by color
matching modem and common-law procedures. It sometimes looks possible, but only if the full range of procedures is ignored. This can be seen in
a major modem area of dispute over the jury's province-personal injury
litigation.
108. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
109. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
110. Under remittitur practice, the judge overrules defendant's motion for a new trial, on the
condition that plaintiff first give up or remit a stated portion of the verdict; if plaintiff refuses to do so,
there is a new trial. Under additur practice, the judge overrules plaintiff's motion for a new trial, on
the condition that defendant first add a stated amount to the verdict; if defendant refuses, there is a
new trial.
IlI. Id. at488. See also F. JAMESsupra note 15, at324-25.
112. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
113. Id. at 336-37.
114. "For to sanction creation of procedural devices which limit the province of the jury to a
greater degree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct contravention of the Seventh
Amendment." Id. at 346.
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Assume a pedestrian is injured by an automobile driver, and an action
is brought for injuries. The position of Justices Black and Rehnquist appears to be that the plaintiff should be able to avoid an adverse verdict if
there is any evidence of negligence, that the plaintiff should not be entitled to a directed verdict if the defendant disputes the evidence of negligence, and that neither party should suffer entry of a judgment n.o.v.
after winning the verdict.' 15 The central argument is that a judge is forbidden by the seventh amendment to evaluate evidence of negligence in
order to control the jury. The erroneous assumption is that the cause of
action must be negligence and that the elements of it must include negligence and proximate cause.
Of course, nothing in the seventh amendment declares what defines a
cause of action, and negligence did not emerge as a specific cause of action until the nineteenth century. 116 If forbidden to use the modem jurycontrol procedures and forced to use those known to the common law, the
judges could still control jury verdicts by manipulating the definition of
the cause of action. If judges thought plaintiffs too often won erroneous
verdicts, they could refine the cause of action to include as an element of
the plaintiff's case proof that the defendant violated a specific regulatory
7
statute, such as by speeding or driving on the wrong side of the road. "1
With such an element to plead and prove, many plaintiffs would be kept
from the courtroom altogether by a demurrer to the complaint. For many
defendants, the demurrer to the evidence would be risk free because there
would be no evidence of a statutory violation, and many plaintiffs would
be forced to accept a nonsuit because of their failure of proof. Most of the
remainder would hear the jury return an adverse verdict in response to the
judge's direction that the element of statutory violation was unproven,
and those rare diehards who actually won a jury verdict would have it
upset by the grant of a new trial.
If instead the jury verdicts ran too heavily against the plaintiffs, the
negligence cause of action could be replaced by strict liability. Similarly,
the violation of statute could be kept as an element, but the burden of
proof could be on the defendant to prove nonviolation. 118 Of course, the
next step would be development of presumptions, so that for certain facts,
a statutory violation would be presumed or even made unnecessary, while
for other facts, the plaintiff might carry the burden of proof. "19 This, of
115. See id. at 346-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Galloway v. United States. 319 U.S. 372.
405-07 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
116.

W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 139-40 (4th ed. 1971): White. The IntellectualOrigins of

Torts in America. 86 YALE L.J. 671, 683-86 (1977).
117.

See F. JAMES, supra note 15, at 270-71:9 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE 517-18 3d ed. 1940).

118.

See F. JAMES, supra note 15, at 255-59.

119.

See id. at 259-66 J. THAYER, supra note 59, at 212-13.
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course, considers only the definition of the cause of action. Defenses and
exceptions to defenses such as contributory negligence and last clear
chance could also be controlled by common-law pleading rules and the
120
common-law jury-control procedures.
It seems accepted that some body can establish the law. Whether courts
or legislatures do so does not matter, but it is clearly not for the jury to
decide whether the civil liability standard is strict liability, negligence, or
statutory violation. The only way to allow the jury to do so would be to
limit pleadings to the equivalent of a common count and the general issue. That would allow the plaintiff to say, "You hurt me," the defendant
to reply "I did not," and would create a single cause of action-civil
wrong-covering everything. That was not true in 1791 and is not really
advocated today. But then the power of the court to continue the common-law practice of developing the law necessarily means that it is hopeless toexpect that color matching 1791 procedures will establish an inherent definition of the province of the jury. 121Perhaps two more examples should be considered. A central part of
Justice Black's position concerned the quantum of evidence needed to
avoid a directed verdict. He argued that the modem rule of "some credi22
ble evidence" was more objectionable than the "scintilla" rule.'
Again, the argument makes sense only with the erroneous assumption
that the legal standard is frozen. The standard could as well be gross negligence as negligence, and then barely credible evidence of negligence
would fall short of being even a scintilla of evidence of gross negligence.
For damages as well, there is no constitutionally mandated standard, a
point ignored in Dimick. If damages cannot be controlled directly by remittitur and additur, the courts can further define the measure of damages. Damages in contract cases have long been more controlled than
those in tort cases. 123 In tort cases, it might be harder to define damages
precisely, and it has been less necessary because the problem of an erroneous amount has been strongly one-sided and subject to remittitur. 124
120. See W. PROSSER, supra note 113, at 416-18, 427-29. See also James, Assumption of Risk,
61 YALEL.J. 141,166-68 (1952).
121. "[Jludges are thus . . . forever advancing, incidentally, but necessarily and as part of
their duty, on the theoretical province of the legislator and the juryman." J. THAYER, supranote 56,
at 208. See generally Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure,31 HARv. L. REv. 669
(1918).
122. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372,403-07 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
123. Cf. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale:A Study in the Industrializationof the Law, 4 J. LEoAL
STUD. 249, 267-74 (1975) (limitations on jury damage awards in contract cases developed during the
nineteenth century in order to maintain judicial efficiency and predictability in coping with increased
numbers of contract disputes spawned by the rapid pace of industrialization).
124. In England, the judges could not use remittitur to control the amount of damages, Watt v.
Watt, 1905 A.C. 115, and the need to have greater judicial control over damage awards was a stated
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If the problem of insufficient verdicts became so great that new trials were
necessary too often, a broader and more specific definition of damages
could be used to raise the level of damages in plaintiff's verdicts.
The trend in the development of procedural innovations has not been
solely toward increasing judicial control over the jury. The ability to exercise control at the pleading stage has all but disappeared because federal
pleading rules require substantially less detail than did common-law
pleading rules. The interdependence of all the procedural steps must be
clear; federal pleading would create an impossible system if the later procedures did not exist. 125
Since judges can achieve the same results by more than a single procedure, it is of little value to consider any one procedure either by itself or in
the abstract. The real concern must be with the application of the procedure to the facts of a specific case. 126 There will always be a continuum of
cases, ranging from those in which all agree that there is no jury issue to
those in which all agree that there is a jury issue, and in the middle, a
band of cases in which judges dispute whether there is a jury issue. There
may be no inherent precise definition of when there is a jury issue or when
the matter is within the province of the jury, but the whole of the cases
provides a body of guiding precedent.
III.
A.

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE AMERICAN JURY
The Jury as an Institution

The general principle advocated in the ratification debates was maximum citizen participation in the work of the courts. Jurors were not to be
limited to deciding historical facts, such as whether the defendant was
exceeding the speed limit, or even to applying the community standard,
such as whether the defendant drove negligently. Jurors were also to decide the wisdom of the speed limit or the validity of negligence as a legal
standard. Nullification is an unworkable example of how the general principle can be put into practice because it requires that every jury be allowed to play a political role. The general principle can still be followed,
but the jury's political role must be played by the jury as an institution.
Some day a specific jury may have to play a major political role if there is
another confrontation on the scale of the American Revolution, but for
the more modest problems of modern litigation, a more modest, gradual,
reason for the virtual elimination of jury trial for personal injury litigation. Ward v. James. [19661 1
Q.B. 273. See W. CORNISH, THE JURY 229-37 (1968).
125. See F. JAMES, supra note 15, at 84-88.
126. "The matter is essentially one to be worked out in particular situations and for particular
types of cases." Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943).
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and institutional political role will suffice. Neither Smith v. Jones nor
even Memorex v. IBM is on the scale of Colonists v. King George III.
The jury's institutional effect on the substantive law is an integral part
of the judge-jury historical test. An issue may become a matter of law for
the judge and cease being a matter of fact for the jury for several reasons.
These can include the need to accommodate legislative policy, the need to
balance competing equities, the danger that a jury will be swayed by
127
improper influences, or the need to have a settled and stable rule.
Whatever the reason the issue was withdrawn from the jury, judges will
always hold differing opinions and there will be a chance to reevaluate
whether the issue should continue to be withdrawn from the jury. In negligence litigation, for example, certain fact situations were held to be negligence or contributory negligence as a matter of law in order to withdraw
the issue from the jury. 128 With the change to comparative negligence,
the old rationale is no longer valid and the courts must reconsider the
extent of jury control. 129 The development and refinement of such procedures as summary judgment and the directed verdict did not destroy
jury trial even though issues and cases were taken from the jury. As trial
and appellate judges considered whether a reasonable factfinder could
possibly reach more than one conclusion, they had to consider how a jury
might find based on the facts. Then the judges had to consider whether the
jury could be allowed to reach more than a single conclusion without
damaging the general interest in legal stability and equality. These limitations do not keep the jury as an institution from playing a political role
consistent with the seventh amendment history.
The civil jury also plays a political role in that its presence is a reaffirmation that the American form of government is a universal suffrage republic in which every citizen has a right to vote and be heard.' 30 In many
ways, the full promise of the constitutional doctrine of equality has taken
centuries to accomplish. In the federal courts, it was only in 1968131 that
Congress mandated a juror selection system intended to assure that jurors
would be a "fair cross-section of the persons residing in the commu127. Weiner, The Civil Jury and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1918-38
(1966).
128. James, Functionsof JudgeandJury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949).
129. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 275-318 (1974); see generally James, Tort
Law in Midstream:Its Challenge to the Judicial Process. 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 315, 342-44 (1959)
(suggesting that allowing juries broad latitude in factfinding promotes equitable results).
130. Carrigan, The Importance of Being Unpopular-And Independent, 5 LITIGATION, Summer
1979, at 5, 67; Renfrew, The Vital Role of the Jury, 2 LIGATION, Winter 1976, at 5; Wigmore, A
Programfor the Trialof JuryTrial, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC. 166, 169-70 (1929).
131. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (1968) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1976)).
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nity." 132 The idea of a cross-section jury appears daring or radical when
compared with the practice in England before 1791, the practice in the
United States in 1791, or the practice in most of the rest of the world. 133
The requirement that the judge and jury share the decision-making responsibility is a powerful reminder of the basic democratic principle of
American government.
One of the arguments for the seventh amendment and for nullification
was the need to keep the law courts from becoming instruments of oppression. In the modem United States there is little danger that the federal
courts will become agents of the British Crown or enemies of the people,
as the revolutionaries asserted colonial courts had become.1 34 Still, lawyers and judges inevitably, by education and profession, do not typify the
average American and are generally somewhat removed from the needs
and wants of the rest of the country. Lawyers and judges from law school
onward increasingly focus on legal doctrine and abstract policy. Although
both are extremely important in the effort to make the law stable and
equal, it is possible to get wrapped up in the quest for logical doctrine and
well-executed policy and to forget about the real effects of the law and
litigation. 135 The classic nullification doctrine required that the law be
kept simple enough for the average juror, no matter how complicated the
situation to which the law applied. Such a limitation is not necessary.
Since the jury does not always have to decide all issues in the case, the
law can, in some places, be complicated beyond the understanding of the
136
jurors when that complication is required by the factual situation.
The jury can also change the substantive law, but in a more indirect
way than suggested by classic nullification doctrine and the "black box"
argument of Judge Becker. Under that doctrine, the jury's political role
has been described as a little parliament. 137 Unfortunately, the jury lacks
132.

28 U.S.C. § 1863 (b) (3) (1976).

133. Contrast the federal court standard with that used in Germany to select lay members for a
mixed court, as described in Langbein. Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative FilltheAmerican Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 195, 206-08 (1981).
134.

See Devitt. Federal Civil JurY Trials Should be Abolished, 60 A.B.A. J. 570, 572 (1974):

Steuer, The Case Against the JurY, 47 N.Y.ST. B.J. 101, 144-46 (1975): Norton. What a Jun Is. 16
VA. L. REV. 261 (1930).

135.

I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 347-50: Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury. 5

VAND L. REV 150(1952).

136. The recent article by Professors Luneburg and Nordenberg advocates that complex cases
should be tried to a special jury, with each juror being required to have at least a college degree.
Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 6,at 946-47. Their argument for such a standard depends upon
the assumption that the complexity problem is caused by jurors' lack of education and that judges will
be unable to better define the issues in the complex cases. In addition, their choice of a college degree
as the standard appears arbitrary and inconsistent with the historical trend toward representative jury
panels.
137.

P. DEVLIN, supra note 20, at 164.
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knowledge of what prior parliaments have done and cannot influence
what later ones will do. Again, the rejection of the classic nullification
doctrine requires some alternative description of how the jury can play its
political role of affecting the substantive law.
As an alternative to such a catch phrase, perhaps the jury as an institution should be considered an ongoing referendum. Each jury panel provides one bit of data that in sum, over all juries, provides an enormously
useful amount of information about the substantive law. Each jury verdict
provides the courts and lawmakers with the most valuable information
about the community view of a particular law because each verdict is
based on careful consideration of the application of the law'to a fact situation that the jury has considered in great detail. The difference between
the little-parliament theory and the ongoing-referendum theory is both a
difference in emphasis and in result.
Again, the history of the contributory negligence doctrine provides an
illustration. In the decades when contributory negligence was the reigning
doctrine, many jury verdicts for plaintiffs were set aside on judgment
n.o.v. on the ground that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. In other cases, the verdict was set aside and a new trial
awarded. Through it all, the jury was either condemned for erroneous
factfinding or defended for nullifying the law. A better view is that these
jury verdicts were a referendum response that the substantive tort doctrine
was no longer acceptable in a significant number of factual situations.
The judicial response should have been either to change the substantive
law to follow the referendum or to further withdraw the issue from the
jury because verdicts were being consistently based on improper factors.

138

Finally, the jury performs a political role as a reminder of the independence of the courts, assuring that the judgment in each case is based only
on the law and on the facts proven at trial. Judges and lawyers get used to
handling the same kind of cases repeatedly, so there is always the occupational risk of bureaucratization. 139 The view that the facts of a particular
case are no different from those of the last case robs the law of its vital
force and defeats consistent justice. The jury is less likely to stereotype a
case because every case is new to it. The knowledge that the jury will see
each case afresh reminds judges and lawyers that they should also. In
138. See generally James, supra note 128, at 685-90 (when judges adhere to tort law theories
that do not conform to popular expectations of what the law should be, jury verdicts hasten the
demise of such theories); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge'sFreedom andResponsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1283-88 (1951) (judges should instruct the jury in extant, though unpopular, legal doctrines,
but they may and should allow the jury to reach an equitable result in the Anglo-American legal
tradition of using the jury to modify the rigor of the law and effect gradual reform).
139. See Summers, Some Merits of CivilJury Trials, 39 TUL. L. REv. 3, 11-12 (1964).
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addition, the jury is more or less anonymous, so that judges and lawyers
cannot assume that the jury panel shares their own biases, prejudices, or
world outlook. The jury is thus a valuable guard against hasty treatment
of ideas or people, and a force for a just decision that is independent of
the immediate concerns of the day.
One procedure unique to jury trial that serves to keep the law free from
transient political pressure is the voir dire. Jurors have the habit, annoying at times, of answering bluntly and openly on voir dire when asked for
their views. 140 The case law on challenges for cause represents an ongoing discussion about how to respond to these juror disclosures, as the
courts try to keep the trial free from improper taint without at the same
time striking every juror who ever thought about any issue. Without voir
dire, the influence of political, racial, social, economic, religious, ethnic,
and countless other factors would be ignored by assuming that the judge
would not be affected. With voir dire they cannot be ignored. Even with
voir dire the influence of irrelevant factors may not be eliminated and at
times the effort to weed out prejudice may be overdone. Still it is better to
discuss the issue than to ignore it.
B.

Nullification in Negligence Litigation

The jury's institutional political role can be easily overlooked because
too much attention has been given to a direct, nullification-type political
role for the jury. This description of the jury's role is both logically unsound and inconsistent with the nullification arguments of the ratification
debates. It has been stated so often, however, and has a strong enough
surface appeal that it persists, appearing again in the complexity debate.
The nullification description of the jury's role was most strongly advocated to defend or describe the jury's performance in negligent tort cases,
for several decades the prime area of dispute about the value or inadequacy of the civil jury. 141 Critics of the jury argued that jurors would find
negligence when it was not supported by the evidence, and that they
would refuse to find contributory negligence when it clearly was present.
On such evidence the jury was variously condemned as effete and sterile, 14 2 a societal antique, 143 or the quintessence of governmental arbitrari-

ness. 144 The defenders of the jury accepted the argument that the jury was
140.
141.

See, e.g., Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973).
See. e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 120-23, 127-35 (1949): J. ULNAN. A JUDGE TAKES

THE STAND 21-34 (1933); Green, supra note 8; James, supra note 128. See also Weiner. supra note
127, at 1876-94 (analyzing the degree to which juries decide questions of law in negligence actions).
142. Sebille, Trial by'Jury: An Ineffective Survival. 10 A.B.A.J. 53. 55 (1924).
143.
144.

L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 416 (1930).
J. FRANK, supra note 141, at 132.
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finding negligence even if not proven and not finding contributory negligence that was proven. They defended the jury by asserting that it was
playing a political role by returning verdicts at odds with the formal law.
The defense of this renegade role was that jury nullification made the law
more just and more in conformance with community sentiment by lowering the standard of negligence and applying comparative negligence. 145
This kind of a nullification role for the jury is logically unsound. In
ordinary negligence cases it assumes juries will exercise a consistent proplaintiff, anti-corporation, anti-insurer bias. Of course, juror biases are
not so predictable nor do all cases involve a sympathy-deserving plaintiff
suing a corporate defendant. The proponents of this nullification role
never fully analyzed or discussed what were good or bad biases. The
nullification role required that every jury play a political role, so every
jury needed all the right biases and none of the wrong. That is impossible,
because there is no way to tell about any particular jury and no discreet
way to explain it to the individual jurors. 146 As new types of cases, such
as civil rights actions, were added to the federal docket, the weakness of
47
an argument based on juror bias should have become even clearer. 1
Despite the appearance of similarity, the modem nullification argument
for negligence actions is not the same as the nullification argument in the
ratification debates; it is at most only sometimes nullification. The modem jury-control devices, such as summary judgment and the directed verdict, keep clear cases from the jury and so beyond any nullifying power.
In contrast, the ratification speakers implied that even in clear cases juries
would be able to deny recovery to British creditors solely because they
were aliens. 148 The effect of this misleading appearance can be seen in
Judge Becker's two opinions in Zenith-the approving quotations of the

145. See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 349-50; Curtis, supra note 135; Holmes, Law in
Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 459-60 (1899); James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218, 246-48 (1961);
Joiner, supra note 8, at 18-19; Pound, Law in Books andLaw in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 18-19
(1910); Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the JudicialProcess, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 635,638-40(1958);
Wigmore, supranote 130, at 169-71; Wyzanski, supranote 138, at 1285-86; Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 354-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also 374 U.S. 865-68
(1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting from approval of amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that would permit special verdicts); G. CALABRES & P. BOBBrrr, TRAGIc CHoIcEs 57-64,
208 n.12 (1978) (observing that the jury is the prototype of a responsible agency charged with making
difficult, perhaps tragic, choices).
146. See Redish, supranote 85, at 507-08; Steuer, supranote 131, at 140.
147. See Rendleman, Chaptersof the Civil Jury, 65 Ky. L.J. 769 (1977).
148. Wolfram, supranote 15, at 703-05.
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ratification position in one opinion 49 are followed by another opinion
granting summary judgment. 150
The nullification argument in the negligence cases did not prevent development of jury-control devices or application of those devices to limit
jury power in negligence litigation. That may have been in part because
the nullification argument was primarily an overstated position by those
in favor of more relaxed limits on jury factfinding. The argument that the
facts presented an issue for the jury could always be buttressed by the
claim that the jury should always resolve all factual disputes with the quotations from the nullification history added as a gloss. 151
The combination of the persistence of the nullification argument in
negligence cases and the recent attention to the ratification history increases the apparent attractiveness of a definition of the jury's role in
complex cases that includes a direct political role. That apparent attractiveness is misleading because the substantive issues in the cases are substantially different. In negligence cases, the nullification argument supports jury factfinding on issues within the experience and understanding
of the jury, such as whether a driver was negligent, but the same is not
true for all issues in the complex cases. 152 The seventh amendment does
not require that the jury be the sole factfinder, and it does not forbid development of judicial factfinding under the judge-jury historical test.
IV.

JUDICIAL FACTFINDING UNDER THE HISTORICAL
TEST

The general problem with jury trial in complex cases is that the jury
may be expected to do too much, whether deciding too many issues, deciding issues that are too complicated, or both. It may be possible to subdivide a case into parts with fewer issues, it may be possible to refine the
substantive law to make issues less complicated, and it may be possible to
make the jury a more efficient or expert factfinder. 153 All these steps seem
likely to fall short of reducing every complex case to a manageable size.

149. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 938-42 (E.D. Pa.
1979). vacated sub noin. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig.. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
150. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).

151. Even Justice Black's dissent in Galloway can be so interpreted, as he concluded his nullification argument with a concession that some directed verdicts might be proper. Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372, 407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). Part 11 of Justice Black's dissent indicates

that one major reason for his difference of opinion on the existence of a jury question was a basically
different approach to the central factual issue of "total and permanent" disability. Id. at 408- 11.

supra note 15. at 298-99.

152.

See F.

153.

See Lempert, supra note 6, at 97-132.

JAMES,

The Jury and Complex Cases
Then the only alternative to complete elimination of a right to jury trial
will be greater direct factfinding on some issues by the judge.
The judge is already allowed to do some factfinding in deciding motions, such as for summary judgment, directed verdict, or new trial, but
those motions just establish outer limits on what can be reasonably inferred from the evidence. Can the judge do more and directly establish
certain issues by, for example, defining the relevant market in an antitrust
case? 154 If so, some cases might no longer reach the jury because summary judgment would then be proper. Others would be shorter and less
complicated because the jury instructions would define the relevant market and the jury would not have to hear the evidence on that issue.
The historical judge-jury test establishes that the seventh amendment
does not forbid such direct judicial factfinding. In applying the judge-jury
historical test, it is essential to avoid two false paths. One false path is
strict historicism, or trying to match modern complex cases to 1791 cases
issue by issue. The cases and issues are too different to permit such direct
comparisons. The other false path is the distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact. The often stated division of labor that assigns
questions of law to the judge and questions of fact to the jury is too superficial because there is no natural or inherent distinction between issues of
fact and law. 155 These are labels, useful when judicial factfinding is disguised by calling the matter a question of law, 156 but hardly useful when
trying to decide if the issue should be given to the jury.
It should not be too surprising to find no perfect analogy in 1791 procedure that can be simply dusted off and put to use today. Modern issues,
such as defining the relevant market in an antitrust case, are substantially
more complicated than 1791 issues. Judges also are not doing very much
obvious direct factfinding today because such direct factfinding does not
persist. Developing case law and statutory enactments refine the substantive law, producing more specific standards and narrower issues that can
be submitted to the jury. 157 For example, in negligence cases, the judicial
factfinding controls only at the edges, determining what reasonably could
be found as negligence or contributory negligence.
It is notable that many of the examples of direct judicial factfinding
have involved a test of reasonableness, such as determinations of reasonable time in commercial cases or reasonable cause in cases of malicious
prosecution or false imprisonment. The test of reasonableness appears to
154. See Jorde, supranote 6, at 36-43.
155. See F. JAMES, supra note 13, at 266-71; Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REv. 1303
(1942); Weiner, supranote 124, at 1867-76. See generally J. THAYER, supranote 56, at 183-262.
156. J. THAYER, supranote 59, at 202, 230; Devlin, supranote 3, at 83.
157. J. THAYER, supranote 59, at 207-08; 9 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 117, at 520.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 58:1, 1982

create a fixed legal standard, while allowing flexibility in application to
the facts of particular cases. The reasonableness standard may offer only
limited guidance if a jury is the factfinder, as the jury is given only limited
information about what is done in practice and no information about what
has been found reasonable in other cases. As a result, the issue of reasonableness has at times been decided by judges and at time by juries. 58
Many English and early American cases treated the issue of reasonableness in contract cases and negotiable instrument cases as an issue for
the judge in order to have fixed rules that would allow greater precision in
business. 159 Today statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code establish many definite standards of what is reasonable, so direct judicial factfinding is not as necessary. 160 In actions for malicious prosecution or false
imprisonment, the judges also decided whether there was reasonable
cause for the action in order to protect those who came forward in aid of
public justice from the uncertainty of the jury's factfinding.161 For such
cases there are fewer modem statutes defining what is reasonable, but
judges still decide the limits of what might be considered reasonable
cause. Negligence cases might have been similarly treated, but there was
no equivalent need for precision or protection of a public policy. Therefore, judges did not directly decide the reasonableness issue in each
case. 162
Some issues in complex cases may be similar to these reasonableness
issues-not yet well defined but flexible, either deliberately so or as the
result of differing judicial interpretations of the law. 163 In these complex
cases there is a need for some precision, predictability, and a public policy to effectuate. The usual procedures of summary judgment or directed
verdict are not sufficient to reduce some of the complex cases to a size the
jury can handle, especially if judges believe that the seventh amendment
requires that every possible factual dispute be decided by the jury. The
next step in making the case manageable must be greater judicial factfinding on certain issues, such as the definition of the relevant market or the
meaning of monopolization.
Once the need for greater judicial factfinding on a certain issue is recognized, it is necessary to have some procedure to make it possible. For
158.
159.
160.

Weiner. supra note 127, at 1876.
Id. at 1895-1910.
Id. at 1903-06.

161.

Id. at 1910-18; J. THAYER. supra note 59, at 230. See also W. CORNISH. supra note 124, at

224-27.
162. Some judges, and particularly Justice Holmes, did advocate judicial determination of what
was negligent. Weiner, supra note 127, at 1893-94. See also J. THAYER, supra note 59. at 208.
Another area of continuous reexamination of the jury's role has been that of contract interpretation.
See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 218-27 (1960).
163. See Blecher & Daniels, supra note 3. at 79-82.

The Jury and Complex Cases
some cases and some issues, it may suffice to raise the standard of what is
sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, but that
will dispose of only a few. For most of the complex cases the only way to
reduce the number or complexity of the issues will be by actual judicial
resolution of factual disputes, a process that appears to necessitate some
form of bench hearing on certain issues.
Of course a bench hearing on certain issues may look like a bench trial
of the entire case, and if those issues are controlling, it will be a bench
trial of the case. However, that would not be a goal, and often the result
would be only a set of jury instructions framing certain issues for the jury
to decide on the basis of evidence presented in the usual trial. If the hearing were held on the issue of market definition, the jury instructions
would establish the relevant markets; if it were on the meaning of monopolization, the hearing would establish which specific actions would be
sufficient if proven at the trial. Such a hearing would go beyond the modem pretrial conference or conference on jury instructions because the
judge would resolve factual disputes in order to narrow the issues to a
number that comfortably could be tried and decided by the jury. 164
The jury should have a nontrivial role, but it should not operate unchecked. As suggested by Judge Becker in his Zenith opinion, the jury
serves a line-drawing function by returning a general verdict in "borderline" cases. 165 The borderline case may be one of two kinds. In one, the
"who did what" facts are unclear so that the factfinder must determine
the credibility and value of the evidence. Although this is sometimes a
difficult job, it is not the real source of the complexity problem, particularly if the issues are clearly defined by the judge. The complexity problem concerns borderline cases in which the "facts" in dispute depend on
more important policy choices--intent to monopolize, monopoly power,
intent to defraud-and for such factfinding line drawing has the effect of
policy making. If the issue is clear, a summary judgment or directed ver164. The Supreme Court has upheld some other kinds of nonjury factfinding. In re Walter Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920). There the Court rejected a seventh amendment challenge to the power of a
district judge to appoint an auditor in an action at law to simplify and clarify the issues. There was no
specific common-law analogy for such an auditor, but again the Court relied on the judge-jury historical test and held:
The command of the Seventh Amendment . . . does not prohibit the introduction of new
methods for determining what facts are actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the introduction of
new rules of evidence . . . . New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration ofjustice.
Id. at 309-10. It is worth emphasizing again thatPeterson should not be subject to a strict historicism
interpretation that the factfinding must be done by an auditor and not a judge. Peterson is instead a
further illustration of the flexibility of the judge-jury historical test. See also Scott, supra note 121, at
690-91.
165. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 941 (E.D. Pa.
1979), vacatedsub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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dict makes the jury unnecessary. When the issue is not clear, Judge
Becker implies that the jury should always decide because it is a borderline case. The judge-jury historical development, on the other hand, indicates that the jury should not decide every borderline case and certainly
not if the jury seems unable to grasp the important issues. In automobile
negligence cases, product liability cases, or even professional negligence
cases, the jury may seem able to grasp the issues that are defined, and
therefore is allowed to play a policy-making role by deciding issues such
as the definition of negligence. Since the jury does not seem as able in the
complex cases, the jury role must be cut back, either by changing the
substantive law to make the borderline issue irrelevant or by more direct
judicial factfinding. Reevaluation of the judge-jury relationship is a job
that never ends because the substantive law and jurors' experience and
ability never stops changing.
The question of which particular issues should be decided by the judge
will not be further explored here. That is a matter of detail in the substantive law. 166 This article is primarily concerned with establishing the need
for a different procedural perspective. Since the judge-jury historical test
makes clear that there is no inherent seventh amendment definition of a
jury issue, the search for the perfect historical analogy for a modem issue
or procedure is no longer necessary. The province or historic domain of
the jury must be considered and reconsidered issue by issue.
V.

PRESERVING THE PROTECTION OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT

The proposed solution of more direct judicial factfinding might make it
seem that the end result of the judge-jury historical test is the same as for
many of the other approaches. Whatever the appearance, the judge-jury
historical test will better preserve the protection of the seventh amendment because it will better avoid the danger of the "slippery slope" of
unrestrained judicial discretion. The solutions that eliminate the jury entirely from certain cases, whether by the law-equity historical test or the
due process approach, create a great risk that lawyers and judges will get
used to trying those cases without a jury. Once such cases become exclusively tried by judges, it is unlikely they will ever be tried to a jury again,
even if the law becomes better refined so that some issues could be handled by a jury. Even worse, the absence of any clear precedent to define
166. Some commentators have considered whether current antitrust law requires jury factfinding
on issues the jury cannot understand. See. e.g., II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER. ANTITRUST LAw 52
(1978): Report to the President and the Attorney General of the Nat'l Comm'n for the Review of
Antitrust Laws & Procedures (1979); Blecher & Carlo, supra note 3. at 741-52.
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the boundary of the nonjury category creates the risk of an ever-increasing number of cases found too complex for a jury. 167
Direct judicial factfinding under the judge-jury historical test does not
eliminate such risks, but it does reduce them. The judge-jury relationship
is treated as a political process in which both parties have responsibility
and power. The jury is potentially available in every case, and judges will
always have to consider whether, under the substantive law and evidence,
there is an issue proper for decision by a jury. Judicial opinion on the
ability and value of the jury will vary across a range, and the use made of
the jury as a factfinder will vary among judges and across time. 168 Instead
of a frozen position, the cases will produce swings like a pendulum, depending on which judicial opinion is prevalent. The limits on the pendulum swings at each end are also not fixed or frozen, but there is always a
general consensus about the jury's role that limits the swings. That consensus is developed from precedent, in the common-law, case-by-case
style, a process that permits change and evaluation of change but avoids
great leaps into unknown areas that may be impossible to undo. 169
167. This absence of clear guiding precedent is also the prime objection to a solution that would
transfer trials of complex cases to a nonjury expert tribunal as advocated in one article. Luneburg &
Nordenberg, supra note 6, at 950-1007. Their proposal is based on the opinion in Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), and further depends on the
broadest interpretation of that opinion. I have previously argued that the Atlas conclusion is not supported by the precedent cited in the opinion. Kirst, AdministrativePenaltiesand the Civil Jury: The
Supreme Court'sAssault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (1978). Professors
Luneburg and Nordenberg appear to agree at least in part with my conclusion that the cases do not
support the Atlas conclusion. E.g., 67 VA. L. REV. at 958-59 (discussing Crowell v. Benson). Nowhere do they state any disagreement with my conclusion. Nevertheless, they do not adequately
explain why Atlas should be read as broadly as possible.
Administrative agencies may not fit well with the classic doctrine of separation of powers, and
advocates of administrative action can hail Atlas as a correct result. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 59-148, 188-93 (2d ed. 1978). Such a view may eventually be shown to be preferable, but under that view many constitutional limits, including the seventh amendment, must be
considered irrelevant or interpreted differently. Such a policy debate about the continued wisdom of
the seventh amendment is always possible, but the approach of Professors Luneburg and Nordenberg
does not reach the real issues of the policy debate because they assume that Atlas is a correct interpretation of precedent.
The historical test applied in Atlas might be called a judicial-nonjudicial power historical test. It
has typically been employed with the same attention to historical detail as for the law-equity historical
test. It has not used the broader approach to historical detail of the judge-jury historical test, and it is
difficult to understand how that could be done. In any event, the Court in Atlas purported to follow
historical detail carefully. I agree that the historical detail should be followed carefully and consider it
dangerous to build any further on an unsound foundation of misinterpreted precedent.
168. P. DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 128 (1979). See generally id. at 117-48.
169. The history of the special verdict or general verdict with interrogatories in negligence litigation is instructive. Both were strongly advocated as necessary devices to limit the jury to a narrow
factfinding role. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 56, 70 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948) (opinions of Frank & Hand, JJ.). The special verdict and the
general verdict with interrogatories were authorized in federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 49. Justices
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This article advocates an approach to the complexity problem that considers the jury a valuable part of civil procedure, but one that must be
used correctly. It has not sought to defend the civil jury in general, as it
seems that most participants in the complexity debate are not deeply committed jury abolitionists. Most proponents of the complexity exception
appear motivated by the frustration of lengthy trials on complicated issues, all to a jury that apparently never will understand what it takes years
for judges and lawyers to understand. They are willing to eliminate the
jury, and risk the "slippery slope" problem, because the value of the jury
appears clearly outweighed by the damage done.
The value of the jury as an institution may not be apparent in individual
cases. In each case, the jury's primary role is adjudication-finding the
facts and applying the law. But as an institution, the value of the jury lies
in its political role of maximizing citizen participation in the courts. The
civil jury is becoming more and more a uniquely American institution that
affirms our commitment to citizen involvement in government. It is necessarily a complex institution, and like any complex institution, it has a
learning curve for those who use it. Because of the learning curve, the
civil jury system probably could not be set up successfully in the United
States today and could not be reinstituted if abandoned for even a short
time. 170 Fortunately, we have 190 years of experience under the seventh
amendment and centuries of experience before that to provide guidance
on how efficiently to operate a civil trial system in which both judge and
jury are partners with shared responsibility.
Each debate in the controversy about the civil jury should refine the
definition of the role of the civil jury because, after each debate, more is
known about the value, ability, disadvantage, and history of the civil
jury. The complexity debate has demonstrated that there are very finite
limits to the value of precedent under the law-equity historical test, and
that the jury nullification doctrine is fundamentally unsound. The complexity debate has further shown that an institutional political role for the
jury will best accommodate the full history of the seventh amendment. It
is now time to move forward in each area of the substantive law so that
the jury can continue to play its proper role in civil trials.

Black and Douglas argued that Rule 49 violated the seventh amendment. 374 U.S. 865, 867-68

(1963) (Minority Statement opposing transmission to Congress of 1963 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). To date, neither device can be said to have destroyed the protection of the
seventh amendment; in practice federal judges have made sparing use of them. The decision to use

either device must be made on a case-by-case basis and depends on each judge's assessment of the
need for or value of the device. See generally F. JAMES, supra note 15. at 295-302.
170. P. DEVLIN, supra note 169, at 174-76; Haines. Preface to C. JOINER. supra note 8. at vii.

